

*Annex C
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TICOM/I-165

Included

INTERROGATION OF KAPITAN ZUR SEE

OTTO VON BAUMBACH

Attached are extracts from the report on the interrogation of VON BAUMBACH, former German Naval Attache at MOSCOW and head of OKM 3 SKL from 1942 to 1944, carried out in August 1945 by British and American officers, and forwarded by B.N. C-in-C Germany (NID 0051603/45).

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Russian Naval Communications.

5. Until about 1938, prospective communicators took a special course at the Naval Academy. Since then, however, communications have been combined with the regular deck officer's training. It is VON BAUMBACH's opinion that Russian communications are outstanding from the point of view of cryptography. Technically he was in no position to judge. At no time during the war, as far as source knew, did the Germans break highly classified Russian codes. They had some success in deciphering addressees and signatures, thus securing ship lists, etc., but the body of the message was not broken. Abteilung III of the Marinennachrichtendienst (Naval Communications), was the office in the German Admiralty charged with the intercept and 'Y' Service. In the Autumn of 1941, a Fregattenkapitaen TEUBNER, then head of this division, told VON BAUMBACH in great excitement that they had broken the Russian code (VON BAUMBACH never knew which code he had reference to). The key to the code was the book, "The History of the Communist Party". (Note: The English letter equivalents of the Russian title are "Istoria Komunistitschesky Partii"). Source later heard that the Russians changed this code shortly thereafter. While VON BAUMBACH was in 3 SKL he received practically no reports from decoded Russian despatches. (Note: The last two heads of MND III were Kapitaen zur See KUPFER and his predecessor, Kapitaen zur See BONATZ).

Miscellaneous.

11. (a) 3 SKL (Naval Intelligence) - 3 SKL was the section of the German Navy which received and evaluated reports coming from Naval Attaches, Abwehr, deciphered code intercepts, foreign radio intercepts, foreign press reports, diplomatic reports and reports from the Forschungsamt of the Luftwaffe (this was the Development and Intelligence Section of the Luftwaffe). Personnel of 3 SKL consisted of six to eight officers and 150 employees. The officers were all older men, few if any of the regular navy, and were considered by VON BAUMBACH as being mediocre. In 1942 about 900 reports were received daily. In 1943 and up until the time when VON BAUMBACH left, only about 600 reports were received daily. The volume of reports by source was divided in approximately the following percentages: 5% from Abwehr; 3% from B-Dienst (Y Service); 10% deciphered from diplomatic reports; one-half of one percent from German Naval Attache reports 70% foreign press and radio intercepts; the balance being miscellaneous, such as reports from the Forschungsamt (Luftwaffe), diplomatic reports and a few agents' reports. 3 SKL was evacuated to SENGWARDEN, near WILHELMSHAVEN, about the beginning of December 1944. When questioned regarding foreign agents, VON BAUMBACH was positive that the Germans had no naval agents in the United States or England. There were two in South Africa. He said they received some information from captains of merchant vessels who made their way from South America to the United States, but the information received from them was of little consequence. The Abwehr reports came mostly from the west, i.e., France, Spain, Portugal, Morocco, etc. The reports were evaluated by VON BAUMBACH as follows:- B-Dienst (Y-Service) -

excellent; deciphered diplomatic despatches - good, but little naval information; Naval Attaches - quite good, but not much naval information. The rest of the information received was considered by VON BAUMBACH to be so unimportant that he allowed his subordinates to dispose of most of it.

11. (d) German Success with Allied Codes - While VON BAUMBACH was obviously not too familiar with the subject, he had the following to say about Allied codes: In general, almost nothing was obtained from U.S. Navy traffic with the exception of certain instances where task force signatures had been broken. Somewhat more was said to have been obtained from the British Navy. In the Spring of 1943, some 70 British code messages used to reach VON BAUMBACH's desk daily. This suddenly dropped to 20 or 30 and never picked up again. Source was positive that the joint code used by Allied convoys had been broken, but he did not know when this had occurred, nor had he seen any of the messages.